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The Physician's Responsibility 
Toward Sacred Human Life 
(The 11 co-authors are listed at the end of this article.) 
A recent article in the New England 10urnal of Medicine on "The 
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients"! I) encourages 
non-treatment of patients, 2) confuses the right of privacy with a patient's 
decision to refuse a treatment gravely burdensome to himself, 3) 
encourages "living will" statutes which lack the prerequisites for informed 
consent and are otherwise objectionable, and 4) states that a physician 
cannot participate in suicide because " .. . this is contrary to the law." 
However, it omits noting the inherent immorality of assisted suicide and 
the fundamental obligations of physicians entrusted with recommending 
therapy to protect and promote physical, mental, and emotional health. 
Physicians have had , and will continue to have, professional obligations , 
moral duties, and ethical responsibilities when treating each and every 
patient. For many physicians, these responsibilities are rooted in religious 
principles, yet other doctors lacking formal religious affiliations or beliefs 
affirm them as well. The history of their broad acceptance is reflected in 
the Oath of Hippocrates, the Declaration of Geneva, the Nuremberg 
Code, and elsewhere. It is under the guidance of their standards that 
medicine has achieved its greatest advancements. 
The N ElM article states "[t]he patient's right to maJ<.e decisions about 
his or her medical care is clear. That right, grounded in both common law 
and the constitutional right to privacy, includes the right to refuse life 
sustaining treatment...". While the Constitution expressly protects certain 
specified privacy interests such as the Fourth Amendment's guarantee 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it recognizes no general, all-
encompassing right to privacy. In our system of jurisprudence, it is proper 
for the courts to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the values 
and principles rooted in its language and history. However, when new 
constitutional "rights" are created without regard to any value or principle 
that is fairly discoverable in the Constitution, those "rights" are 
illegitimate. 2 
Roe v. Wade,) the 1973 decision of the Supreme Court that recognized a 
"right" of privacy sufficiently broad to legalize abortion-on-demand from 
fertilization through birth, is a definitive example of illegitimate judicial 
review. 4 This decision, which serves as the cornerstone for extending the 
"right" of privacy to other life issues at other stages of human development, 
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is an unprincipled and unconstitutional display of "raw judicial power."5 
While the rule of law requires our recognition of Roe's "legal" force, our 
consciences and professional integrity compel rejection of its moral force . 
Upholding Sanctity of Life 
Moreover, the common law right of a competent patient to refuse 
medical treatment does not diminish the duty of the physician to uphold 
the sanctity of life when advising the patient as to the appropriate course of 
treatment. Neither does it diminish the physician's responsibility to the 
incompetent patient. Indeed. the physician's primary obligation is to 
preserve life and "do no harm." 
Human life is special. For Jews. Christians. Moslems and other 
monotheists. human life is sacred because every human being is created in 
the image and likeness of God . The imperatives of personal and societal 
survival. the desire for civilization, and the universal relevance of the 
Golden Rule dictate respect for human life for all , including those who 
believe neither in religion nor in God . Reverence and care must be given to 
each and every human being, regardless of sex. race. color. creed , or 
whether he or she is in the womb or in a nursing home. handicapped or 
nondisabled, comatose or communicative. young or old. because each 
human being is unique and irreplaceable. 
What effects does this awareness of the special ness of every human life 
and the uniqueness of each human being have on a physician? Let us begin 
by briefly reviewing the routine in which a physician practices when a 
patient comes into his care. He obtains a history. does a physical exam, 
then laboratory studies, perhaps images of internal structures through the 
use of X-rays, ultra-sound, or radio-isotope studies and biopsy when 
needed . Data is collected. Relative to training, experience, and knowledge 
of medical literature, as well as support through appropriate consultation, 
the physician makes a diagnosis. Therapy is then recommended based on 
. . , 
that diagnosIs. 
A wareness of Limitations 
The physician must always be aware of the limitations of the expertise he 
possesses . These limitations are individualized in terms of one's 
knowledge, intelligence, and reasoning ability. Further, these limitations 
are intrinsically related to the basic sciences underlying the practice of 
medicine: biochemistry, physics, etc. Identification of these limitations 
helps the physician to be conscious of the degree of certitude, or lack of 
certitude, which exists for the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis for this 
particular patient. 
Once a diagnosis is made, other factors must be considered. Should a 
patient have more than one serious pathologic process, therapy needs to be 
altered accordingly. For example, a patient with disseminated oat-cell 
carcinoma of the lung can suffer a myocardial infarction. The likelihood of 
such malignancy being fatal and even interfering with healing generally 
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would alter the therapy recommended for simply the heart disease. Or for 
a nother patient who has already had extensive treatment but remains ilL 
perhaps with complications from therapy already used, decisions 
regarding further treatment may be altered. For example , should the 
further treatment be intravenous medication which is toxic to a vein, and 
all the more readily accessible veins have been used , the di sco mfort and 
potential ri sk for using a deeper ve in ma y influence recommendations by 
the doctor and decisions of the patient. In a ll such instances , the sole 
variable is efficacy of medical treatment and never any quality-of-life 
consideration. 
Decisions to use or not use a treatment are otten consIdered aCCOrdIng 10 
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means. "Ordinary" and "extraordinary" 
means represent constructs by some ethicists enabling an understanding of 
the decision by the palienr himseltwho elects to use or not use a particular 
treatment. "Ordinary" means include any treatment, medication , or 
operation which offers a reasonable hope of benefit without requiring 
heroic virtue or causing excessive pain, expense , or other grave burden to 
the patient himself. The patient must use all available "ordinary" means to 
preserve his life. I ncluded in the category of "ordinary" means are keeping 
the patient on a suitable mattress , maintaining an appropriate thermal 
environment, keeping the airway patent , providing water and nutrition, 
providing an exit for stool and urine , and using other readily available 
efficacious therapies. 
Heroic Virtue Required 
"Extraordinary" means include any treatment, medication or operation 
that would require heroic virtue, or be gravely burdensome. While 
ordinarily the patient is not obligated to employ "extraordinary" means, 
he may decide to do so. Such a course could constitute an act of heroic 
virtue . "Extraordinary" means cannot be foregone ip order to kill the 
patient or to advance other immoral ends. Moreover, medical progress 
renders today's "extraordinary" means tomorrow's "ordinary" means . 
In the religious context in which "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means 
originated, they are limited to particular criteria that may (not must) be 
employed by the palienr himself to ascertain his moral duty to utilize 
specific medical treatments. In secular and legal parlance, however, they 
have come to provide a pretext for coercive persuasion to accept the 
imposition of yet another euthanasia subterfuge - i.e., "passive" euthanasia 
and, failing that, for its involuntary application. 
When the patient is unable to speak for himself, the decision regarding 
treatment becomes more complicated. Then the physician must obtain a 
proxy-type consent. This should be as close as possible to the instruction 
the patient himself, if able, would state. Almost always the patient has a 
close family tie with a spouse, a parent, or a child. As a result of these 
bonds , when the patient is unable to communicate for himself, the 
physician has an obligation to communicate with the family. Pertinent 
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info rmation from relatives a nd close friends is extremely helpful at these 
times. Communication with loved ones offers the best chance for 
perso nali zed care for th e patient unable to speak for himself. In no 
instance should the patient's ri g ht to life be violated in favor of any proxy's 
directives, nor should any proxy be permitted to deny the patient life-
prese rvi ng treatment. 
Orders Must Be Precise 
Decisions and written orders to use or not use a treatment for a patient 
must be as prec ise as possible. A decision to perform or not perform an 
operation, to administer or not administer a blood transfusion, to use or 
not use a particular antibiotic, can be made only after the facts and details 
have bee n obtained through a thorough and complete medical evaluation 
of the patie nt. 
Generalizations or non-specific terms such as surgery, antibiotics, or 
blood products are classifications which are too broad for application to a 
particular patient. "No-code" is a prime example of an ambiguous order 
accepted by ph ys icians and courts. But we question if thi s lack of precision 
of thought resulting in mUltiple variations of non-treatment has a place in 
medical practice. Does it mean no maintenance of an airway, or no 
intubation, or no ventilatory support. or no cardiac resuscitation, as well 
as no new or additional therapy') Such broad, non-specific orders are not 
acceptable on other occas io ns of standard medical practice. Why are they 
here'! Furthermore, realizing the weakness of human nature, once the 
course has been plotted by a "no-code,"' ''slow code," or a DNR (Do not 
resuscitate) order. there is a tendency to preclude, eliminate, or reduce 
other kinds of "ordinary" treatment. such as visits by physicians and care 
given by nurses. 
The privilege to treat our fellow man includes ~'esponsibil i t i es, 
obligations and duties. There is a duty to help patients obtain the morally 
licit medical treatment they require . There is a responsibility to understand 
that the concept of "extraordinary" means is neither universal nor open-
ended. There is an obligation to preserve life when the physician cannot yet 
cure. Those who del iver medical and nursing care must never kill the 
patient either intentionally or through culpable negligence . If this occurs , 
th e responsibility or duty associated with the privilege of treat ing our 
fellow man is violated. 
Accord ing to a letter by Pless", not only was the Bloomington, Indiana 
"Baby Doe," who had esophageal atresia and Down's syndrome, denied 
medically indicated surgery, but also he " .. . was given phenobarbital (5 
mg) and morphine (2.5 mg) as needed for pain and restlessness." While the 
administration of these and other drugs can be morally and medically 
acceptable to relieve pain, when given at 5-10 times the dose ordinarily 
needed for this , the question is "Why such a high dose?" Did thirst and 
starvat ion cause this infant to be so very uncomfortable? Or was this high 
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dose intended to depress ventilation and hasten death? The behavior of 
these physicians was professionally unacceptable. 
Withdrawing or withholding essential means of sustaining life, such as 
food, water and protection from exposure is morally - if not always 
"legally"-tantamount to murder, and professionally unacceptable for one 
who is privileged to help the sick. Prior to the death of Karen Quinlan, to 
have stopped feeding her, to have failed to treat life-threatening infections 
with antibiotics, or not to have kept her room warm, would have resulted 
in hastening her death. It would have been the moral equivalent of murder. 
Physician Responsible for Best Medical Care 
The physician has a responsibility to provide the best possible medical 
care for the patient. Yet, he must also understand the emotional changes 
that accompany physical illness and provide support and hope when the 
situation is interpreted by the patient or family to be overwhelming. 
Even though the ultimate responsibility for the decision regarding 
medical treatment generally lies with the patient himself, commonly the 
physician is asked to provide guidance and direction . At these times the 
physician must be mindful of the privilege and obligation he has to 
safeguard the life of the patient, as well as the lives of others who may be 
endangered as a result of such decisions. 
The physician-patient relationship has may attributes, any of which can 
be abused by either the physician or the patient. One that can be abused 
easily by the physician revolves around the position the powerful physician 
holds in comparison to the weak and ill patient. He must be mindful of this 
as he makes decisions and recommends treatments for a patient. The 
potential for abuse increases when the patient is unresponsive, 
unconscious , unable to communicate, or at the ebbing of life when the 
patient is so very defenseless. , 
When the patient deems a specific treatment "extraordinary" and directs 
that it not be used , that directive applies solely to that specific treatment 
and in all cases the patient must continue to receive all "ordinary" care. At 
all times, including when dying, the patient must be treated as a human 
person who has rights. When a treatment is contraindicated or no longer 
indicated, we must realize that we are not "letting him or her die;" rather, 
we realize that that particular treatment is of no use in the struggle against 
death. Death may occur despite our best efforts to preserve life, but we 
shall never be death's expediters. 
The N £J M article lists four categories for "The Incompetent Patient": 
I. " Patients with brain death." The lack of scientific validation for "brain death" 
criteria and the questionable morality of what is occurring in this area have 
been discussed in depth in recent publications7.8. Be it sufficient here to point 
out how the a uthors of the N £J M article are willing to call a patient "dead" 
when there is "irreversible cessation 01 all junctions of the brain ... " in 
contrast to their following category of "persistent vegetative state," when the 
" neocortex is largely and irreversibly destroyed." (Emphasis added). 
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Need less to say, none of the brain-related criteria for dea th a re adequate for 
the diagnosis of dest ruction of the brain, much less dea th of the perso n. 
2. " Patients in a persistent vegeta ti ve sta te." Cranford, a nd very likely a ll the 
authors of t he N EJ M article, are fami liar with Sgt. David Mack of 
M inneapolis9, who was d iagnosed as being in such condition. After 22 months 
of bein g unresponsive, those taking ca re of him noticed eye movement , on ly 
then to find out from Sgt. Mack that he had been aware of those around him 
for at lease six months before anyo ne knew that he was a nything other tha n in 
"a pers istent vegetative state." Would they now agree tha t it wo uld have been 
accepta ble to have withheld nutrition and hydration from Sgt. Mack? 
3. "Severely and irreve rsibly demented patients." The word "severely" was not 
defined by the authors a nd therefore is subject to excess ive ly wide 
interpretation. " Irrevers ibly" cannot be empirica ll y determined. lo It is not 
app ropri a te to ap ply such adverbs ca tegori zing patients. While the authors 
speak to making the patient comforta ble, where are the studies showing the 
patient dying of dehydration a nd starvation is comfortable? Nor is comfort a 
substitute for life, much less a rationale for dea th . 
4. "E lder ly patients wit h permanent mild impa irment of competence." To be in 
such a state does not requi re attainment of age. Furthermore, "elderly" in itself 
is not a precise term. In fact, one dictionary defines it as " beyo nd middle age." 
Medicine should not accept such vacuous philosophica l specula tions. 
The difficulties are compounded when an individual has previously 
executed a "living will", indicating an approach to non-therapy. A major 
deficiency in a "living will" is that it is executed without the information 
and data needed to make such a decision and accordingly, violates the 
fundamental principles of informed consent. The "living will" decreases 
the possibility of adequate testing and treating diseases that would 
otherwise be diagnosed and treated. Furthermore, while attempting to 
"simplify" proxy directives, it does this only in a death-embracing man ner. 
Physicians must exclude their own narrow self-interest when making 
decisions or when asking the patient or the person whose consent is legally 
required for a particular treatment. One can readily appreciate that 
personal advantages or disadvantages regarding legal liability, prolonged 
or inconvenient hours required to treat, or compromised compensation 
from a Medicare-Medicaid-welfare patient, can influence a physician's 
decisions. The physician must always keep the rights and responsibilities 
of the patient in compliance with sound medical ethics foremost in the 
decision-making process. 
Member of Health Care Team 
A physician does not carry out his duties and responsibilities in a 
vacuum. The physician is a member of a health care team including nurses, 
respiratory therapists, administrators, phys ical therapists, social workers, 
pastoral care personnel, secretaries, and others working in the hospital or 
treatment setting. Each and everyone of these is a human being with his 
own values, privileges and responsibilities in terms of delivering medical 
care to another human being. Each one has power and strength in relation 
to his own intentions, training, and personality. Each one has deficiencies 
and frailties . Each one must understand the strengths, weaknesses and 
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limitations of the ill patient , especially when the patient is unresponsive, 
comatose, or otherwise unable to communicate through spoken or written 
language or when he or she happens to be at an ebb in his or her own life. 
That human life is sacred must be foremost as medical and nursing care 
is administered. Human life is a basic good. The right to life is a 
fundamental God-given right. Without life there are no other rights or 
goods for a human being. When medical and nursing care are delivered 
without identifying the sacredness of human life and the right to live, the 
priorities are radically different. When society establishes that human life 
is not sacred and man has dominion over life and death , such as the case in 
abortion , infanticide, and euthanasia, then not only is the physician-
patient relationship altered , but so are all other relationships between 
human beings. 
There is a large and growing number in society, including physicians , 
who regard life as sacred because it is a gift from Almighty God. For each 
person, there is a life span on earth determined by God. Human beings 
have obligations toward themselves and each other to respect this life-
span. The basis for these obligations are the Judeo-Christian beliefs which 
were included in the very foundation of our country. Slipping away from 
them has seriously injured "the land of the free , and the home of the 
brave." There is a way to practice medicine and to live together, still 
maintaining respect for human life, without the weak being the victims of 
the strong. 
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